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Abstract 
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1. Introduction. 
The removal of the foreign exchange risk in January 1999 and the elimination (or reduction to insignificant levels) of 
different tax treatments during the 90s eliminated two of the main components of EMU sovereign yield differentials, 
which prompted a significant convergence in spreads over 10 year German securities during the period January 1999-
December 2001. Nevertheless, the convergence only brought about a sizeable reduction in relative borrowing costs in 
the countries that presented wider spreads, lower rating and higher foreign exchange risk. Conversely, the countries that 
benefited less from the elimination of the exchange rate risk experienced an increase in their relative borrowing costs 
(see table 1). The objective of this paper is twofold: first, to decompose European yield spreads into the two main 
domestic risk components (liquidity and credit risk differences) that remain after the EMU; second, to determine 
whether there has been a change in the price assigned to them by markets, since the introduction of the euro. However, 
this analysis first requires a correction of pre-EMU spreads for the foreign exchange factor. Thus, following Favero et 
al.(1997) we break down the total differential over German securities into two components: (i) the foreign exchange 
factor and (ii) other factors, where the first component is estimated as the differential between the 10-year swap rate in 
the currency of denomination of the corresponding bond and the 10-year swap rate in Deutschemarks. Interestingly, 
once adjusted for the swap differential, spreads rose for all countries after Currency Union (see table 1). The sample is 
composed of daily data from January 1996 to December 2001 (the same extension is then considered both for the pre-
EMU and the EMU period) and includes all EMU countries except Luxembourg and Greece. We use the credit rating 
as a proxy to measure differences in credit risk, and both the bid/ask spread and the overall outstanding amount of 
public debt securities for each issuer, in the case of differences in market liquidity (the independent variables are all 
relative to the German values). The main results of the analysis show a change in the market assessment of relative 
market size values. Specifically, they suggest the existence of a non-linear relationship between relative indebtedness 
levels and adjusted spreads, which was accentuated by EMU. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents some considerations on credit risk and market liquidity; section 3 describes the data, section 4 explains the 
estimation method and reports the results; finally, section 5 draws conclusions. 
2. Credit risk and market liquidity. 
Firstly, we will assess whether EMU increased credit risk by denying governments the emergency exit of money creation 
and by stating that neither the ECB nor individual governments can be obliged to bail out troubled governments or 
whether, on the other hand, the maximum threshold that countries have had since EMU for both their budget deficit 
and level of public indebtedness actually resulted in a decrease in perceived credit risk. To do so, we will use credit rating 
will be used as a proxy to measure differences in credit risk. Even though there is the risk that ratings may be ex-post 
measures of fiscal sustainability, we think that they present an advantage over other measures, such as the debt-to-GDP 
ratio in that they potentially affects the creditworthiness of the governments but not the liquidity of their public debt 
issues1. Ratings then seem to be the best variable for use in the model where the relative level of indebtedness is used as 
a proxy of market depth; otherwise, multicollinearity would pose a significant problem. Secondly, the introduction of 
the euro reduced some segmentation among euro-area government bond markets as exchange risk removal brought 
down a major barrier that previously had fostered captive domestic markets. In this more competitive scenario, the 
                                                 
1 However, when we have estimated the same model using the debt-to-GDP ratio as a proxy of credit risk and only the bid/ask spread as a proxy of 
market liquidity very similar results were obtained.  
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second point that we will study is whether market liquidity differences increased their relevance. We use two proxy 
variables to measure this effect: the bid/ask spread and the overall outstanding volume of sovereign debt. The former 
reflects the cost incurred by a typical investor in unwinding an asset position and measures market tightness. The latter 
is considered a measure of market depth because larger markets may present lower information costs since their 
securities are likely to trade frequently and a relative large number of investors may own or have analysed their features. 
Inoue (1999) states that in G10 countries, the larger the outstanding stock of publicly issued central government debt, 
generally the higher the turnover in cash and futures trading, and the better the liquidity. Martin and Rey (2004) show 
that, in general, size matters for asset trade, that is a larger country will benefit more from higher asset prices than a 
smaller one. McCauley and Remolona (2000) note that if important fixed costs are involved in producing information 
on the future path of interest rates, the size of the whole debt market matters. In particular, they estimate that there may 
be a size threshold of around $100-200 billions, below which sustaining a liquid government market may not be easy 
(table 2 shows that only five countries in the euro-area are above this threshold). Finally, Economides and Siow (1988) 
point out that there might be a trade-off between liquidity and market size. Hence, if size matters for liquidity, “ex-ante” 
traders will prefer bigger and liquid markets, so liquidity will be “self-reinforcing”. To the best of our knowledge no 
empirical analyses have been published to date using a daily dataset for one of the most important measures of liquidity, 
the bid/ask spreads, which corresponds to the trading activity that takes place in the whole of the euro-securities 
market.  
3. Data description. 
As we need to correct pre-EMU yield spreads for the foreign exchange component, we thus approximate the expected 
exchange rate change to the swap differential. So, we denominate: 
Ii,10       =  10-year  Yield on sovereign bonds of country i 
IRSi,10= 10-years Interest Rate Swap rate of currency i  
Where, considering that differences in tax-regimes have been reduced to insignificant levels during the 1990s: 
Ii,10= f(DRi,10 , Li,10 , ERi., 10)                                                                                                                                               (1) 
DRi,10 = Default risk of country i 10-year sovereign bonds.  
Li,10    = Liquidity of country i 10-year sovereign bonds. 
ERi., 10  = Exchange rate risk of currency i over a 10-year horizon. 
Therefore the 10-year yield differential of country i over Germany will be: 
[Ii,10 - IGE,10]t =f([DR i,10 - DRGE,10]t , [Li,10 - LGE,10]t , [ERi,10 - ERGE,10]t)                                                                               (2) 
Then aproximating:  
 [IRSi,10 - IRSGE,10]t=[ERi,10 - ERGE,10] t                                                                                                                              (3)                                                         
The variable “ADJUSTED SPREADit”, i.e. the difference between the total yield differential and the swap rate 
differential, which will be used as the dependant variable, will mainly account for credit risk and market liquidity 
differences of country i’s sovereign securities over Germany. 
YIELD SPREADit  = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t =f( [DRi,10 - DRGE,10]t , [Li,10 - LGE,10]t , [ERi,10 - ERGE,10]t)                                           (2)                                      
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ADJUSTED SPREADit     = ASPREADit  =  
  = [Ii,10 - IGE,10]t  – [IRSi,10 - IRSGE,10]t =  f([DRi,10 - DRGE,10]t , [Li,10 - LGE,10]t)                                                                     (4)                                                                            
Yields and swap rates are obtained from Datastream and correspond to the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-year issue for 
each market at every moment of time. They are quoted rates at market close. Datastream creates continuous yield series 
by taking the yield from the current benchmark in each market and using this to update a separate time series. As a 
benchmark changes, data are taken from a new stock on the first day of the month. With regard to the explanatory 
variables, for the credit rating, a scale (see Blanco 2001) is calculated using both Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s ratings 
which have been obtained from Bloomberg. In the case of the bid/ask spreads series, daily time-series are created by 
calculating the spread between the bid and ask quotations provided by Bloomberg for the “on the run” (benchmark) 10-
year issue for each market at every moment of time, using the benchmarks and starting dates that Datastream uses to 
create the 10-year yields and swap rates series. For all the different issues, Bloomberg provides daily quoted prices 
calculated as the average bid and ask quotations at the close. Finally, the overall outstanding amounts of public debt data 
are taken from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS; see table 2). However, as these series are only provided eacj 
quarter, we build up the relative level of indebtedness daily time-series, extrapolating the rest of the data by assuming a 
daily constant rate of increase of those volumes, which in fact present very slight differences within countries 
throughout the studied period. For this reason, it can be assumed that the extrapolation will not produce significant 
biases in the data and can be applied in this case. All the variables included in the estimation are relative to the German 
ones, as our dependant variable (ASPREADit) is the difference between the total yield differential and the swap 
differential of country i over Germany. Therefore, BIDASKDIFit is the difference between the bid/ask spread in 
country i and the bid/ask spread in Germany, OUTDEBTRATit is the ratio of the overall outstanding amount of 
sovereign debt in country i to the overall amount in Germany, and RATINGDIFit  is the difference between the rating 
scale value of country i  and that of Germany. 
4. Estimation and results. 
We carry out a panel estimation using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), which are robust to the possible 
existence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the error terms. Besides, country and monthly dummy variables 
are introduced in the specification, in order to capture the potential existence of both specific features by countries and 
temporal effects. Moreover, as the goal is to analyse whether the marginal effect of the variables varies with the start of 
EMU, we also introduce a dummy (DPRE) that takes the value 1 in the pre-EMU period (and 0, otherwise), and  
calculate the coefficients of the interactions between this dummy and the rest of the variables. Finally, to assess whether  
there exists a varying relationship between relative debt levels and yield ASPREADSit  a quadratic specification for the 
variable OUTDEBTRATit. is formulated. Therefore the estimated model is:  
 yit = i + Xit +γDPREit +δMONTHLYDUMMIESt  + λCOUNTRYDUMMIESi + it                                               (5)                                        
where previously defined: OUTDEBTRAT2it= (OUTDEBTRATit)2 , the independent variables vector is: 
Xit= (BIDASKDIFit, OUTDEBTRATit , OUTDEBTRAT2it, RATINGDIFit:)                                                                (6)                            
In addition,   = 1 + 2DPREit                                                                                                                                      (7)                                   
Hence, the marginal effect of a variable is:  = 1 (in the EMU period), and   = 1 + 2 (in the pre-EMU) 
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Tables 3 shows the values and standard errors of the estimated coefficients. For each exogenous variable, this table 
presents the corresponding marginal effects for the EMU period (1) and the pre-EMU (1+ 2). The main conclusions 
are that a change in the market assessment of liquidity measured by both the bid/ask spreads and relative market size 
levels, rather than credit risk, could be the factor behind the rise in adjusted spreads with EMU. So, even though the 
results support the idea that ASPREADSit carry a credit risk premium to compensate investors for bearing default risk, 
this premium does not increase with Monetary Integration. Conversely, the bid/ask spread marginal impact is not only 
positively significant in both periods, but also rises in the EMU period. Note that as market dealers reduce their liquidity 
risk, bid/ask spreads should narrow with trading activity (and hence with EMU). In this context, the estimation only 
shows that their “positively” significant marginal impact on ASPREADSit has risen with EMU. This only means that 
their “significance”, i.e., the value that agents give to market liquidity has increased with EMU; it does not necessarily 
mean that their value has risen (which, indeed, would be inconsistent with the effects one would expect from economies 
of scale in larger markets). In the case of the relative level of indebtedness, the results support the existence of a 
negative non-linear relationship in both periods, whose marginal impact on adjusted spreads rises in absolute terms with 
Currency Union (the smaller the market, the larger the increase). Therefore, especially for small markets, market size 
scale economies seem to have risen with EMU. Actually, the countries with a larger debt market relative to Germany 
(Italy, France and Spain) are the ones with the lowest rises in their adjusted spread (see tables 1 and 2) due to a decline in 
their liquidity premium. Along the same lines, other authors such as Bernoth et al. (2004) also state that after the start of 
EMU German government bond yields are still below those of bonds issued by governments with much better debt 
positions due to the size of their bond market, which seems to support our conclusions. 
5. Conclusions.  
Euro-area countries’ adjusted spreads over 10-yr German securities experienced an average increase of 11.98 basis 
points after EMU. This resulted in a lower decrease in borrowing costs than expected. Our results show that a change in 
the market assessment of relative market size levels could be reason for this behaviour. In particular, the results support 
the existence of a non-linear relationship between relative debt levels and adjusted spreads which was accentuated by 
EMU. Therefore, as the German sovereign debt market is the second-biggest market in the euro-area, with Currency 
Union all countries may have experienced a decrease in their relative liquidity that has been translated in higher adjusted 
spreads. Hence, in the current context of increased competition among euro-area government securities markets their 
success might be limited by the extent of their liquidity and market size. 
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TABLE 1      
 
 
NOTE: AT: Austria, BE: Belgium, FI: Finland, FR: France, IE: Ireland, IT: Italy, NL: The Netherlands, PT: Portugal, SP: Spain. Source: Datastream.  
(Ii- IDM) = 10-year yield difference over Germany. (IRSi – IRSDM) = 10-year interest rate swap difference over Germany. ASPREADi = (Ii- IDM) –  
(IRSi – IRSDM) 
 
TABLE 2 
Source: Bank for International Settlements 
 
TABLE 3 
 
DOMESTIC DEBT SECURITIES 
PUBLIC SECTOR AMOUNTS OUTSTANDING
(Billions of euros)
  1995-12   1996-12   1997-12   1998-12   1999-12   2000-12 2001-12 average % over EMU
     Ireland 19.93 23.20 23.12 21.93 24.73 24.07 19.95 23.15 0.69
     Portugal 35.19 36.47 32.84 34.04 37.49 42.35 45.61 37.67 1.13
     Finland 33.20 38.15 41.56 44.28 45.60 47.70 46.28 43.39 1.30
     Austria 57.04 58.95 63.87 69.28 86.05 99.74 100.52 76.80 2.30
     Greece 64.10 79.58 84.47 84.80 88.43 96.73 102.20 87.23 2.62
     Netherlands 155.64 159.89 159.68 170.12 178.14 180.98 177.50 171.44 5.14
     Belgium 228.86 230.59 228.41 229.67 231.85 246.18 248.66 236.75 7.10
     Spain 211.07 241.63 259.63 272.41 287.34 311.04 299.43 269.56 8.09
     France 497.35 536.05 565.50 623.91 639.85 708.45 709.23 614.79 18.45
     Germany 676.53 682.74 699.45 738.75 767.35 816.77 790.81 734.97 22.05
     Italy 896.49 1022.19 1011.08 1037.09 1042.62 1088.36 1056.96 1036.69 31.11
     EMU 2875.40 3109.45 3169.63 3326.27 3429.43 3662.37 3597.15 3332.43 100.00
PRE-EMU (1996-1998) EMU (1999-2001) Diffeerences
between EMU and pre-EMU
(Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi (Ii-IDM) (IRSi-IRSDM) ASPREADi (ii-iDM) ASPREADi
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5) (4)-(1) (6)-(3)
AT 9.07 -0.33 9.40 24.42 -0.01 24.43 15.34 15.03
BE 33.06 4.29 28.77 46.30 -0.01 46.31 13.24 17.53
FI 43.56 41.31 2.25 21.95 -0.01 21.96 -21.61 19.71
FR 2.97 -3.10 6.07 14.05 0.00 14.05 11.08 7.98
IE 50.52 43.84 6.68 14.78 0.00 14.78 -35.74 8.10
IT 157.73 133.04 24.69 32.32 0.05 32.27 -125.40 7.58
NL -2.70 -3.52 0.83 14.22 -0.01 14.23 16.92 13.40
PT 111.73 91.42 20.31 31.85 0.22 31.63 -79.88 11.31
SP 118.06 97.99 20.07 27.24 0.04 27.20 -90.82 7.13
Average 58.22 44.99 13.23 25.24 0.03 25.21 -32.99 11.98
St.dev. 57.48 51.37 10.33 10.66 0.08 10.64 53.77 4.69
Cross-Sectional Time-Serie FGLS Regression, with country dummies
Sample: Pre-EMU: 1996:01-1998:12; EMU: 1999:01-2001-12
dependent variable: ASPREAD it
BIDASKDIF it OUTDEBTRAT it OUTDEBTRAT2 it RATINGDIF it
ß(EMU) =ß 1 (X it ) 0.167** -0.320** -0.130** 0.014**
(0.020) (0.059) (0.038) (0.002)
ß 2 (DPRE it *X it ) -0.064** 0.096** -0.024** 0.005**
(0.024) (0.012) (0.009) (0.001)
ß (preEMU) = ß 1 + ß 2 0.103** -0.225** -0.154** 0.019**
Number of observations = 12928
Number of groups = 9
Avg obs per group = 1440.56
Log likelihood = 25386.52
Wald chi2 = 50894.2
Prob > chi2 = 0.00
**Significant at 5 percent confidence level.*Significant at 10 percent confidence level.
Standard Errors within parentheses
